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"If you hurt and cry, I'll tax your tears"*"
Until recently, Congress generally excluded tort awards and
settlements for personal injuries to individuals from "gross income" and
thus exempted them from federal income taxation. The sole test for this
exclusion under section 104(a) of the Internal Revenue Code was
whether tort recovery for personal injury was involved.! Although this
recovery could include items as diverse as mental distress and lost
income, the nature of the specific elements of the damages award was
irrelevant. As a result, this exclusion covered all the elements of tort
recovery, including such otherwise taxable items as lost income.2
Despite debate about the reasons for this approach, it was consistently
followed for decades However, in 1989, Congress began limiting the
exclusion. This process began with an amendment to section 104(a) to
provide that punitive awards were taxable as income unless they were
in connection with a case "involving physical injury or physical
** THE BEATLES, Taxman, on REVOLVER (EMI Records 1966) (written by George
Harrison). The lyrics to this song indicate that the "taxman" wants 95% of your goods, that if
you complain about this rate he will take it all, that if you ask what will be done with it, he will
take more, and that you should "declare the pennies on your eyes" when you die. The lyrics also
contain the following:

If you
If you
If you
If you

drive a car, I'll tax the street
try to sit, I'll tax your seat
get too cold, I'll tax the heat
take a walk, I'll tax your feet

'Cause I'm the taxman, yeah, I'm the taxman.
1.Section 104(a)(2) provides that "gross income does not include.., the amount of any
damages ... received... on account of personal... injuries. ..." 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(2)

(West 1997). This quotation provides the general framework and does not contain the references
to punitive damages, physical injuries, and emotional distress. For discussion of these details,
see infra notes 4-7, 103-11 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 4-7, 68-111 and accompanying text.
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sickness."4 In 1996, section 104(a) was again amended to subject all
punitive damages to income taxation.5 Congress made another fundamental change in 1996 by amending the Code to provide, for the first
time, that some compensatory awards for personal injury must be
included in income. More specifically, section 104(a) was amended to
provide that the traditional exclusion from income of "damages
received.., on account of personal injuries as sickness" did not apply
to a victim's claim for "emotional distress"6 unless the claim had "its
origin in a physical injury or physical sickness."7 Because of this new
treatment of damages for mental distress, victims of torts like assault
must now pay income tax on any award or settlement that compensates
for the psychic trauma from the fear and terror of being assaulted.
Though there may be merit in the new approach to punitive
damages, the change in the treatment of compensatory damages for
mental distress raises serious constitutional questions. Compensatory
damages are meant to "make the victim whole again" by restoring the
victim to the status quo before the tort. Moreover, damages for mental
trauma do not replace something, like lost wages, that would otherwise
be income. Thus, it is questionable whether compensation for mental
distress constitutes income in any ordinary sense of the term. If these
damages are not income, is it constitutional to tax them as such?
Addressing this issue requires an examination of the legal framework for
taxation of income and of the nature and purpose of compensatory
damages for mental trauma. The constitutional framework is addressed
in Part I of this Article. Part II summarizes the statutory approach to the
taxation of tort damages. The nature of tort damages for mental distress
is discussed in Part HIL. Part IV argues that it is unconstitutional to treat
awards for mental distress as income.

4. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994).
5. 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (West 1997).
6. Id. See infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
legislative change.
7. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-737, at 3011 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1793; see 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (West 1997). Section 104(a) still allows the taxpayer to exempt
from income "an amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care...
attributable to emotional distress." 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (West 1997).
8. Punitive awards were held to fall within the statutory definition of income where the
award did not involve personal injury. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S.
426 (1955). For criticisms of the exclusion of punitive awards, see infra note 74.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1997], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

I. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

A. The Apportionment Requirementfor
Capitationor Other Direct Taxes
The Constitution grants Congress extensive powers of taxation.
Article I provides Congress with the "Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.... ." This
power is subject to a number of limits, however ° In terms of income
taxation, the most important limit is that "[n]o Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.""
The precise scope of this limit is uncertain because, when one moves
beyond certain easy examples, the meaning of the phrase "Capitation,
or other direct, Tax" is not clear. A capitation tax is a direct tax
imposed on a person, as a person, rather than imposed on an activity or
on real or personal property. 2 The poll tax is clearly a capitation tax
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10. In addition to the limit on direct taxation discussed in the text, the Constitution also
limits the congressional power to tax in several ways. First, "all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States ....
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.Second, "[n]o
Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." Id. § 9, cl. 5. Third, "[n]o
Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State
over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State be obliged to enter, clear,
or pay Duties in another." Id. cl. 6. Fourth, the exercise of the taxation power, like other
congressional powers, is subject to general provisions like the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. See Hemandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 693 (1989) (holding that deduction limitations on charitable
contributions to churches did not offend First Amendment); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R.,
240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916) (recognizing in principle that Fifth Amendment limits power to tax);
1 BORIs BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs,

HI 1.2.5, 1.2.6 (1989) (reviewing authorities and concluding that Congress is subject to due
process limits, but has not been held to violate them in income taxation). Other general limits
include the restriction on diminishment of judges' salaries, the need to respect federalism in
terms of taxing state and municipal governments or income from their bonds, and the restrictions
implicit in the treatment of Indian tribes as sovereign entities. Id. T7 1.2.7, 1.2.8, 1.2.9.

11. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XVI. This apportionment requirement is also contained in Article I, Section 2, clause 3, which provides:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons,
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
12. See Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 343 (1874).
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because it is levied upon each person regardless of activity or property
(or lack of property). 3 However, it is not clear what, if any, other tax
would be a capitation tax. The phrase "other direct tax" presents similar
difficulties. Taxes on real property appear to have been definitely
included in the term, 4 but there was arguably no certainty among the
drafters as to other inclusions.' 5 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
term "direct tax" to include a tax on property, whether real or personal,
or a tax on the income from property, but not to include "taxation on
business, privileges, or employment," which is indirect taxation.16
The reason for the limitation on direct taxation is the subject of
debate. Two reasons have been suggested. First, the limit is viewed as
based on concerns of federalism and the need to limit the taxation
powers of the central government. Second, the limitation has been
characterized as a politically necessary restriction on the federal taxation
of slaves. Because such a tax would obviously fall mostly on the
southern states, these states would be reluctant to ratify the Constitution
without the limitation.
From the perspective that the limitation is based on federalism, the
provision is viewed as a compromise "intended to guard against.., the
exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing
persons and property within any State through a majority made up from
the other States." 7 Thus, the provision is "one of the bulwarks of
private rights and private property." 8 It is important to note that the
concern is not to protect property within a particular state from taxation
imposed by a majority of that particular state's population; each state is
free to impose direct taxation on its citizens and on property within the
state. Instead, the concern is to ensure that this power is not exercised
by the central federal government except in "extraordinary emergencies," in which case the tax must be apportioned. 9 The concern for
13. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281 (1937); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S.

433, 444 (1868).
14. See Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 343 (1874); Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796); THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 215 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
15. See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court also has determined
that the term does not include an excise type tax on income from "transactions" involving the
property. See infra notes 32, 186-92 and accompanying text.
17. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 582 (1895) [hereinafter Pollock
1]; see Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177 (Patterson, J.) (concern of southern states to prevent
extensive holdings in slaves and real property from being taxed by majority vote of other states);
BrITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 1.2.2, at 1-15.
18. Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 583.
19. Id.
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relating taxation to representation was central to the drafters of the
Constitution 2° and continues to be a concern to state supreme courts in
interpreting their state constitutions.2 In more modern terms, the
concern was that only the legislators in one's own state could impose
a direct tax, not the distant congressional legislators "inside the beltway"
in Washington, D.C. The legislators in one's own state are closer and
more easily influenced by local concerns and viewpoints. Moreover, it
is easier to move to a different state with a different taxing scheme than
it is to leave the country. The limitation also protects the ability of state
and local governments to raise revenues by limiting the central
government's ability to use certain types of taxes.
The other view is that the limitation was related to the issue of
slavery. Under this view, slave states agreed to accept congressional
representation based upon a system that counted a slave as three-fifths
of a person so long as direct taxation was similarly apportioned.'
Moreover, since slaves were a unique form of property owned mostly
in the southern states, any direct tax on slaves would be felt
disproportionately by the southern states."
It is not clear whether the limitation was adopted for one or the other
or both reasons. From a modern perspective, the limitation on direct
taxation is now meaningless surplusage if one assumes that taxation of
slaves is the only concern. However, if one takes the view that the
limitation is concerned with allocating taxation powers between the
federal and state levels and with protecting private rights from the
actions of a majority acting through the federal government, then the
limitation is still important in modern times. The Supreme Court has
adopted this view because it has determined that the limitation is still
viable despite the abolition of slavery by the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment.' 4
For decades, neither the meaning of nor the reason for the limitation
on direct taxation was relevant in terms of income taxation because
Congress did not use its taxing powers to impose an income tax until

20. See Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEo. L.J. 71, 73 (1996) ("The American
Revolution was, after all, partly a tax revolt."). One might view the apportionment requirement
as a measure of insuring that there would be no "taxation without [meaningful] representation."
21. See Weaver v. Recreation District, 492 S.E.2d 79 (S.C. 1997) (relying on state
"constitutional restriction against taxation without representation' and holding that unelected
special "boards" could not impose taxes). The author is thankful to his colleague, James L.
Underwood, for this point. Sometimes law faculty lounge conversation can be scholarly.
22. See BrITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10,1 1.2.2, at 1-15 to 1-16.
23. See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177.
24. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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additional sources of revenue were needed to finance the Civil War."
The income tax scheme adopted to fund the war was upheld in Springer
v. United States,26 in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge that
this tax was a "direct" tax and, therefore, unconstitutional since it was
not apportioned by census.' After the war, the tax was repealed; and
customs and excise taxes were, once again, the main sources of federal
tax revenues."
In 1894, a new income tax scheme was adopted. This statute was
held to be an unconstitutional direct tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.29 Though Pollock provides limited conceptual guidance on
the distinction between direct and indirect taxes, its holding is reasonably clear. The Pollock Court held that the fact that a tax on real estate
is a direct tax meant that a tax on the income from real estate is also a
direct tax.30 Similarly, a tax on personal property or on the income
from personal property is also direct tax.31 However, the Pollock
opinion suggests that taxation of income in the form of salary, wages,
or profits is not direct because the Court notes:
We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on
income derived from real estate, and from invested personal
property, and have not commented on so much of it as
bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or
employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on
25. See, e.g., BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 1.1.2, at 1-4.
26. 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
27. See id. at 602.
28. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993)
("[Blefore passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Federal Government relied heavily on
liquor, customs, and tobacco taxes to generate operating revenues."); BrITrKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 10, 1.1.2, at 1-4. The sale and lease of public lands also played a role in the raising of
revenues. See generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT
(1968).
29. There are two Pollock decisions. The initial decision addressed only the issues of
taxation of the income from real property and from municipal bonds. See Pollock I, 157 U.S.
at 429. Following this decision, a petition for rehearing was filed requesting the Court to address
issues such as the taxability of personal property and the severability of unconstitutional
provisions. These issues were addressed in the second decision. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) [hereinafter Pollock 11]; BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10,
1.2.2, at 1-18; JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER 119-21
(1995).
30. See Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 579-83.
31. See Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 628, 634. This part of the opinion in Pollock was
addressing a point that had been regarded as uncertain in early cases. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540-47 (1869) (In upholding a tax on bank-circulated notes as akin to a
duty, the Court noted the uncertainty concerning the scope of the term "direct taxes" and
concerning whether taxation of personal property is encompassed in the term.).
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business, privileges, or employments has assumed the guise
of an excise tax and been sustained as such.
The Court also noted that such taxes on "business, privileges, or
employments" were at issue in Springer v. United States,33 and that this
was the reason the income tax scheme involved in Springer had been
upheld.
B. The Sixteenth Amendment and the
Definition of "Income"
The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in 1913 to provide a basis
for a widely-based income tax scheme. The amendment provides that
"Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."35 The effect
of the amendment was not to grant Congress the power to adopt income
taxes; this power already existed. 6 Instead, the amendment simply
eliminated the need for apportionment of any income taxes that might
be viewed as direct taxes.3 However, the amendment does not eliminate the apportionment requirement for direct taxes that do not involve
income. Thus, for example, because a property tax as such is a direct
tax, apportionment would be still necessary if Congress attempted
to tax
38
the property itself, as opposed to income from that property.

32. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635. The Court struck down the entire income tax scheme,
including the taxation of "employments," because it did not feel that Congress intended to adopt
such a narrow scheme. See id. at 636-37.
33. 102 U.S. 586 (1880); see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
34. See Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 578-79; supra note 29 and accompanying text. It has been
argued that it is not likely that the SpringerCourt would view this distinction as important. See
BrrTKER & LoKKEN, supra note 10, 1.2.2, at 1-17. For a defense of Pollock on this point, see
ELY, supra note 29, at 122-24. A corporate income tax was upheld as indirect on the basis of
this distinction in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
36. See, e.g., Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 261-62 (1920); Brushaber,240 U.S. at 17-18;
Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 632-33.
37. E.g., Evans, 253 U.S. at 261-62.
38. See, e.g., Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934) (tax on
"rental value" of building by owner a direct tax since income not involved); Taft v. Bowers, 278
U.S. 470, 481 (1929) ("Mhe Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define
and tax as income without apportionment something which heretofore could not have been
properly regarded as income."); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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1. Constitutional Interpretation
The Supreme Court took the view that just such direct, non-income
taxation of property was involved in Eisner v. Macomber.39 At issue in
Macomberwas the Revenue Act of 1916, which treated a stock dividend
as income.' ° The taxpayer argued that this treatment was unconstitutional since the additional shares simply evidenced her continuing
ownership of the same proportion of the corporation. 41 Thus, though
she had more shares, she had no additional property and therefore had
received no "income." The Supreme Court agreed and held that the
stock dividends were not income and therefore were not taxable under
the Sixteenth Amendment.42 Congress could impose a tax based on the
value of the shares; however, "this would be taxation of property
because of ownership, and hence would require apportionment" since
the taxation would be a direct tax not authorized by the Sixteenth
Amendment.43
As Macomber indicates, the definition of "income" is crucial to
determining the scope of the power granted under the Sixteenth
Amendment. Ifthe tax is imposed on property rather than on income,
the amendment does not apply; and, since a direct tax is involved, the
tax must be apportioned by census. Macomber attempted to guide the
drawing of this distinction by providing a general framework for
defining income." The Court defined income as " 'the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of
capital assets. . . ."' As indicated above,' 6 the Court held that shareholders received no income from a stock dividend because the dividend
did not constitute a "gain." Instead, the dividend affected only the
"form" of the ownership interest and did not "increase the intrinsic
value" of the stockholdings."7
The approach adopted by Macomber of using gain to define
income'8 has been followed in other contexts."9 For example, the
39. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
40. See id. at 199.
41. See id. at 201.
42. See id. at 212.
43. See id. at 217.
44. See id. at 206-08.
45. Id. at 207 (quoting from Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)).
46. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
47. See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 210; see Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604, 607 (1943)
(no gain to shareholders where dividend to shareholder did not change shareholder's proportional
share of ownership of cooperation).
48. In addition to using gain as the measure of income, Macomber also requires a
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Court held in Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co.5 that payments "to
reimburse plaintiff for capital expenditures ... do not constitute income
within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."51 In contrast, where
a gain was realized, then income was held to be involved. 2 For
example, "a gain from capital investment which, when realized, by
conversion into money or other property, constitutes profit which has
consistently been regarded as income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment and taxable as such... .""
The Supreme Court's reliance on gain as a standard for determining
whether income is involved is consistent with the Court's general
approach to the interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment. The
language of the amendment must be the "starting point of any inquiry

realization of that gain-i.e., a "capturing" of the gain through a severance of the gain from
capital by a change in the form or nature of the property. See Macomber, 252 U.S. at 208-19;
see generally BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 5.2 (general discussion of realization). This
aspect of Macomber has been criticized. See, e.g., Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,405, 409
(1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Charles L.B. Lowndes, CurrentConceptions of Taxable Income,
25 OHIO ST. L.J. 151, 171-82 (1964). However, this aspect of Macomber has not been overruled
and has been consistently recognized as a matter of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g.,
Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943). But see Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Constitutional
Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1992)
(arguing that realization is now treated as a matter of administrative convenience); Paul B.
Stephan III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1360 n.3
(1984) (arguing that it is "reasonably certain that the Court no longer views realization as a
constitutional requirement"). The requirement has also been recognized as a matter of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961); Griffiths, 318 U.S. at 392-94, 404. Regardless of the
approach taken concerning realization of a gain, the Supreme Court consistently has held, as a
matter of constitutional and statutory interpretation, that a gain of some sort is required in order
for income to be involved. See infra notes 49-53, 60-62 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Lowndes, supra note 48, at 162-71; L. Hart Wright, The Effect of the Source
of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts: A Chronological
Study, 8 STAN. L. REV. 164, 173-75 (1956) (historical treatment of income and gain as
equivalent concepts). But see Komhauser, supra note 48, at 19 (arguing that treatment of
nonrecourse debt indicates an abandonment of need for a gain).
50. 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
51. Id. at 632-33.
52. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (Improvement to real property by lessee
constituted a gain, and therefore income for lessor.); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 44546 (1936) ("[W]here a stock dividend gives the shareholder an interest different from that which
his former stock holding represented he receives income."); cf.James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213 (1961) (embezzled funds held to be a gain, and therefore income within meaning of
statutory scheme despite argument by dissent that no income within meaning of Sixteenth
Amendment involved); infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (definition of income in tax
code).
53. MacLaughlin v. Alliance Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244, 249 (1932).
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as to what constitutes taxable income... ,," In dealing with this
language, the Court has used the common understanding of the term
"income." "Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment
is... [w]ith few exceptions, if any,... income as the word is known
in the common speech of men.""5
In determining the definition of the word "income" ....
this Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists, and has approved.., what it believed to be the commonly understood
meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of
the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution. 56
Because income in ordinary speech involves a gain, 7 the Court's
emphasis on gain is consistent with ordinary common usage.
2. Interpretation of Income as Used
in the Tax Code
The interpretation of the term "income" in the tax code provides
guidance in interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment because Congress
consistently has expressed its intention to utilize its power under the
Sixteenth Amendment to the fullest extent. As a result, "[tihe starting
point in all cases dealing with the question of the scope of what is
included in 'gross income' begins with the basic premise that the
purpose of Congress was 'to use the full measure of its taxing power.' "8 Though the statutory interpretation cases often avoid general
definitions in favor of an ad hoc approach focusing on the facts of

54. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 248 (1961) (Whittaker, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
55. United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936).
56. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921).
57. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 581 (1977) ("income" defined
as "a gain or recurrent benefit usu. measured in money... [that] derives from capital ... [or]
labor"). Though the Court has rejected the "refinements of lexicographers," see Merchants' Loan
& Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) (emphasis added), and found them to have
"little to add" to case definitions, see Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207, simple straightforward
dictionary definitions should provide guidance on common usage.
58. James, 366 U.S. at 218 (quoting from Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334
(1940)); see also, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1995); United States
v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992).
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individual cases, 9 there is agreement that income involves a gain that
adds to the capital already owned by a person.'
The language of § 22(a) of the 1939 Code, "gains or profits
and income derived from any source whatever," and the
more simplified language of § 61(a) of the 1954 Code, "all
income from whatever source derived," have been held to
encompass all "accessions to wealth clearly realized, and
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."61
Though this emphasis on "accessions to wealth" as central to defining
the term "income" has been utilized within a context of statutory
interpretation, it provides further reason to view gain as a part of the
"commonly understood meaning of the term."'62
C. Conclusion-ConstitutionalIssues Involved
The constitutional requirement of apportionment only applies to
capitation or other direct taxes; apportionment is not required if an
indirect tax is involved. Pollock indicates that taxes on gains or profits
from "business, privileges, or employments" are not direct taxes because
they are not imposed on income from property.63 Therefore, such taxes

59. See, e.g., Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431 (In the context of distinguishing gain
from capital, "the definition [in Eisner v. Macomber] served a useful purpose. But it was not
meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions."); Commissioner v. Wilcox,
327 U.S. 404, 407 (1946), ("[No single conclusive criterion has yet been found to determine
in all situations what is a sufficient gain to support the imposition of an income tax. No more
can be said in general than that all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered.");
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (Since facts indicated that income was
involved, there was "nothing to be gained by the discussion of judicial definitions" of income.).
60. See Bernard Berkowitz & Andrew M. Greenstein, Note, Taxation of Damage
Recoveriesfrom Litigation,40 CORNELL L. REV. 345, 345-46 (1955) (compensatory tort awards
that returned a person to status quo not income since no gain); Lowndes, supra note 48, at 162;
cf. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918) (In interpreting the Corporation
Excise Tax Act of 1909, which imposed tax on corporate income, the Court noted that
" '[i]ncome may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined' " and that "[i]n order to determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the
amount of the gain, if any, [from the sale of capital] we must withdraw from the gross proceeds
an amount sufficient to restore the capital value. .. ." (quoting from Stratton's Independence,
Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
61. James, 366 U.S. at 219 (quoting Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431); see also
United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1952); BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 5.4
(right to tax free recovery of capital before computation of "gain"). The requirement that the
gain or accession be realized is discussed supra at note 48.
62. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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may be imposed by Congress without apportionment and without regard
to the requirements of the Sixteenth Amendment. ' Thus, one issue to
be considered herein is whether the tax on compensatory damages for
mental distress is an indirect tax on income relating to "business,
privileges, or employments." If the tax on compensatory tort damages
is not an indirect tax, then it must be apportioned by census among the
states unless it is an income tax authorized by the Sixteenth Amendment.65 Thus, a second constitutional issue is presented: Is the tax on
compensatory damages a tax on "income" under the Sixteenth Amendment? An essential aspect of income is a gain or accession to capital.'
Consequently, the constitutionality of taxing compensation for mental
distress as income depends upon whether the compensation is a "gain."
The following parts of this Article address these two constitutional
questions by reviewing the historical treatment of tort and tort-like
awards, analyzing the nature and role of compensatory damages for
mental distress, and considering how to interpret the Constitution and
apply it to these tort awards.
H. THE HISTORY OF THE TAXATION OF TORT DAMAGES
The taxation of damages awards and settlements has been treated in
two different ways. First, Congress consistently has excluded such
payments from income so long as the award or settlement constituted an
award for "personal injuries." Under this approach, taxability is
determined solely by the issue of whether the injury is "personal;" the
nature of the damages award is irrelevant. Second, where other,
nonpersonal injuries are involved, the courts have developed an "in lieu
of what test" to determine taxability. Under this test, the focus is on
damages, not the nature of the injury or claim. Any part of an award or
settlement is taxable as income if, and only if, it compensates for
otherwise taxable income.
A. PersonalInjuries-The Total Statutory Exclusion
Initially, Congress decided to use its power under the Sixteenth
Amendment to tax compensatory payments.67 However, beginning in
1918, Congress adopted a pattern of excluding all recoveries for

64. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (upholding tax on corporate
income).
65. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
67. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related
Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (1989).
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"personal injuries" from income." Because this approach focussed on
whether the nature of the injury was "personal," rather than on the
nature of the damages awarded, all recovery for personal injuries,
including recovery for lost income and for punitive damages, was not
taxable. 9
1. Reasons for the Statutory Exclusion
Though Congress has not given an explicit basis for this exclusion,
two reasons for the approach have been suggested. 0 First, the exclusion is viewed as the result of congressional adoption in 1918 of the
view that damages for personal injury constitute a return of capital and
that, therefore, the damages are not income under the Sixteenth Amendment.7" Second, the exclusion is explained in terms of congressional

68. Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (current version at 26
U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(2) (West 1997)).
69. The impact of this approach was increased by the use of "structured settlements" that
allowed plaintiffs to receive tax-free damages payments over time in lieu of lump sum payments
which would have generated taxable income. See Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergenceof LR.C.
§104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, and Structured Tort Settlements: Tax
Policy "Derailed," 51 FoRDHAM L. REV. 565 (1983).

70. In addition to the reasons given in the text, it also has been suggested that the
approach was adopted to address two other problems: (1) the involuntary nature of the
"exchange" of tort injury for tort settlement or award; and (2) the "bunching" of income in the
year of the award or settlement payment, which results in a higher rate of taxation. See Mark
W. Cochran, Should PersonalInjury DamageAwards Be Taxed?, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43,
46-47,49 (1987); Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatoryand Punitive Damagesfor a PersonalInjury:
To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 340-41 (1995); Edward Yorio, The Taxation of
Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy Considerations,62 CoRNELL L. REV. 701, 712-19 (1977).

However, these problems do not require a complete exclusion of the settlement or award. Special
treatment of involuntary awards or income averaging can address these problems, at least to
some extent. See 26 U.S.C. § 1033 (involuntary conversions); id. §§ 1301-1305 (income
averaging); Cochran, supra; Yorio, supra, at 712-19. It also has been suggested that the
treatment is designed to help tortfeasors because juries may award damages high enough to
make the victim whole after taxation or despite a higher "bunch" rate. See, e.g., Kahn, supra,
at 340-41; Yorio, supra, at 719-22.
71. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452, 456 (1996) (history of exclusion of
personal injury recoveries based on decision not to tax "damages that, making up for a loss, seek
to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely, 'return the victim's personal or financial
capital' "); Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432 n.8 ('The long history of departmental rulings
holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable [is based] on the theory that they roughly
correspond to a return of capital .. "). For more complete reviews of this historical
development, see O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 455-56; BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 5.6;
Joseph W. Blackburn, Taxation of PersonalInjury Damages: Recommendationfor Reform, 56
TENN.

L. REV. 601, 663-68 (1989); Burke & Friel, supra note 67, at 13; Paul C. Feinberg,

Federal Income Taxation of Punitive Damages Awarded in PersonalInjury Actions, 42 CASE

W. REs. L. REV. 339, 356-403 (1992); Bertram Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV.
614 (1952); Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment
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benevolence. Under this view, though Congress could tax the awards,
it has made a generous, humanitarian policy decision to assist tort
victims by treating damages recoveries as tax-free. 2 In the alternative,
this humanitarian reason is phrased in favor of a desire to avoid the
appearance of heartlessness which could result from taxing victims.73
Both reasons have been subjected to considerable criticism.
The "return of capital" view has been criticized as being flawed and
outmoded in two respects. First, to the extent that punitive damages or
compensatory damages for injuries such as lost income are involved, the
damages award can be viewed as a gain, not as simply a return of
capital.74 Therefore, the proper approach is to ask, "What are the
damages in lieu off" If the damages are in lieu of capital, then there
is no income so long as there is simply a return of that capital with no
gain; if the damages are in lieu of a loss such as income, then there

Discrimination:Recoveries Under FederalCivil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital,
Realization, and Nonrecognition,72 N.C. L. REV. 549, 579-606 (1994); Kahn, supra note 70,
at 330-39, 341-42; Daniel Candee Knickerbocker, Jr., The Income Tax Treatment of Damages:
A Study in the Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 429 (1962); Tami Dokken
Sandberg, Comment, Unraveling the "In Lieu of What" Test: Title VII Employment Discrimination Damages and the Personal Injury Exclusion: United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867
(1992), 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1019, 1020-24 (1993); Steven Jay Stewart, Note, Damage
Award Taxation Under Section 104(a)(2) of the I.R.C.-Congress Clarifies Application of the
Schleier Test, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1255, 1258-61 (1997).
72. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 71, at 668-69; Cochran, supra note 70, at 51-64;
Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and
the Taxation of PersonalInjury Recoveries, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1115, 1159-60.
73. See Kahn, supra note 70, at 349-52; cf, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 71, at 627
("maxation of recoveries carved from pain and suffering is offensive, and the victim is more
to be pitied rather than taxed.").
74. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 71; Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a Theory of
Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 759 (1988); Burke & Friel, supra note
67; Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain-No Gain?Should PersonalInjury DamagesKeep TheirTax
Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LnlME ROCK L.J. 407 (1986/1987); Cochran, supra note 70; Joseph
M. Dodge, Torts and Taxes, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 150 (1992); Lawrence A. Frolik,
PersonalInjury Compensation as a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1 (1985); Griffith, supra
note 72; Robert J.Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury
Recoveries, 23 HOuS. L. REV. 701 (1986); Patricia T. Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes:
The Still UncertainScope of Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875 (1988); Malcolm L. Morris,
Taxing Economic Loss Recovered in PersonalInjury Actions: Towards a Capital Idea?, 38 U.
FLA. L. REV. 735 (1986); Bernard Wolfman, Current Issues of Federal Tax Policy, 16 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 543 (1994); Yorio, supra note 70; cf, e.g., O'Gilvie, 117 S.Ct. at 456
(punitive damages within statutory definition of income); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,
235 (1992) (statutory back pay award within statutory definition of income and not within
exclusion of § 104).
75. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text for discussion of the "in lieu of what"
test in context of damages not falling within § 104.
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should be an income tax on this part of the damages. In other words, the
award should be allocated between damages that involve a gain and
damages that involve only a return of capital.76
One response to this criticism is that the benefits of the allocation are
not worth the administrative difficulties and that, therefore, all personal
injury damages should be excluded for reasons of administrative
convenience.77 The strength of the administrative convenience response
is questionable," particularly where punitive damages are involved,
given that the Internal Revenue Service has been able to impose its own
allocation between the compensatory and punitive components of
settlements where the parties were'
79 not negotiating the settlement
allocation in an adversarial manner.
The second criticism of the return of capital explanation is based on
a rejection of the view that compensation for personal injury involves
a return of capital. More specifically, viewing compensation as a return
of capital is criticized, as a matter of policy, on the ground that this
characterization requires that "human capital" be treated as having a
"basis"-i.e., an identifiable value reflecting the amount of the
taxpayer's investment.8 " For nonhuman capital, the identification of the
amount of basis is crucial to the determination of whether there has been
a gain because gain has traditionally been defined as any excess over
basis received, for example, through the sale or other exchange of
goods." Thus, if compensatory damages for the tortious destruction of
a truck exceed the plaintiff's basis in the truck, then the plaintiff has a

76. See Morris, supra note 74 (arguing for allocation and taxation of otherwise taxable
"economic losses"); Wolfman, supra note 74, at 547-51.
77. See Dodge, supra note 74, at 150; Griffith, supra note 72, at 1130-35; Henry, supra
note 74, at 726-28.
78. See supra note 76.
79. Compare,e.g., Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396,410 (1995) (service not bound
by nonadversarial settlement) and Robinson v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1995)
(same) with, e.g., McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465, 487 (1994) (allocation in settlement
upheld where parties bargained from adversarial positions); cf., e.g., O'Gilvie, 117 S. CL at 457
("The administrative problem of distinguishing punitive from compensatory elements is likely
to be less serious than, say, distinguishing among the compensatory elements of a settlement
(which difficulty might account for the statute's treatment of, say, lost wages)."). See generally
J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, What Schleier and Amended 104(a)(2) Mean to Your
Practice;Tax Considerationsin Pleadingsand Settlement Agreements, TRIAL, Nov. 1996, at 64,
68-69.
80. For discussion of basis in the context of income taxation, see BrrrKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 10, I 41.1, 42.1-.7. As a very general matter, the amount of the investment is
defined as the purchase price, plus the cost of investments and minus the cost of depreciation
for which a deduction has been or could have been claimed. See id.
81. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 41.1.
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gain in the amount of that excess, which can be treated as income.82
Where human capital is involved, some argue that the basis is zero;
therefore, any compensation for personal injury (as opposed to property
loss, which involves a thing with an identifiable basis) constitutes a gain
in the form of an excess over basis and thus constitutes income.83 This
second criticism will be addressed in more detail below. 4
The benevolence explanation for the statutory exclusion has been
criticized as bad policy on two grounds. First, it is far too benevolent so
long as punitive damages also are excluded, as they have been up until
recently. Second, the exclusion is an unfair method of helping victims,
given that many victims receive no tort compensation." Moreover, the
benefit would go to the tortfeasor in many instances, because in some
86
jurisdictions the jury is informed that the award is not taxable.
Because this Article focuses on the constitutional power of Congress,
the merits of these policy criticisms will not be addressed herein.
2. Judicial Interpretation of the
Statutory Exclusion
Regardless of the reason for the exclusion, it clearly has had an
important effect: The Supreme Court has not had to address the issue of
whether compensatory damages constitute income under the Sixteenth
Amendment. Instead, the Court has focused on matters of statutory
interpretation. Three recent decisions addressing the exclusion from
income of "damages received on account of personal injury" set forth
in section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code reflect this statutory focus.
In O'Gilvie v. United States, 7 the Court held that punitive damages
were not included in the statutory exemption in section 104 because they
82. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 70, at 45-46, 48-49; Dodge, supra note 74, at 153, 18287; Frolik, supra note 74, at 15-32; Griffith, supra note 72, at 1130-35, 1142-58; Kahn, supra
note 70, at 341-47; cf. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CAL. L. REa. 772, 784 (1985) ("Rather than compensating.... [damages for mental distress]
merely would assure a wealthier existence than would have been experienced had there been no
accident."); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REv. 45, 90-92 (1990) (noting
the problem of whether an uncompensated victim should be entitled to a deduction).
84. See infra notes 155-59, 205-25 and accompanying text.
85. See Cochran, supra note 70, at 51-64.
86. See Todd C. McKee, Comment, Klawonn v. Mitchell: Does a Refusal to Instruct a
Jury that Wrongful Death DamagesAre Excluded from Income Taxation Make the Jury's Task
Simpler or More Difficult?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 211, 211 (1995).
87. 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996). Before O'Gilvie was decided, Congress had amended § 104 to
provide that the exemption only applied to damages "other than punitive damages." 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 104(a)(2) (West 1997). Since this provision was not retroactive, it did not control the result
in O'Gilvie. See O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 458.
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did not satisfy the statutory requirement that the exempted damages
award must be received "on account of' personal injuries."0 'Gilvie
indicates that one reason for this interpretation of the statute is that,
when the exemption was originally adopted in 1918, Congress was
concerned with the constitutionality of taxing a "return to capital." 9
This history and the approach it reflects suggest there is
no strong reason for trying to interpret the statute's language to reach beyond those damages that, making up for
a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very
loosely, "return the victim's personal or financial capital." 9
Punitive damages do not fall within the exclusion because they "do not
compensate for any kind of loss," and there is "no evidence that
congressional generosity or concern for administrative convenience"
provide a reason for exempting these noncompensatory damages. 9
In Commissioner v. Schleier,' the Court held that money received
to settle a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) 93 did not fall within the section 104 exclusion. The majority
in Schleier focused on the statutory phrase" 'damages... received on
account of personal injury or sickness'

"9'

and viewed the issue as

whether the settlement was received on account of personal injuries or
sickness. The majority concluded that the settlement was not received
for this reason and therefore held that the settlement did not fall within
the exclusionary language of section 104. 9'
United States v. Burke96 held that a back pay award received as a
settlement of a sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil
88. See O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 454.
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for discussion of this historical context.
90. O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 456.
91. See id.
92. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
94. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328 n.3, 329.
95. The ADEA permits "the recovery 'of wages lost and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages.' " Id.at 325 (citing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
§ 216(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)). There is no separate recovery for pain and suffering or
emotional distress. See id. at 326. Given that the claim was based on discrimination, rather than
personal injury, and given the limited remedies available, the Court concluded that damages
under the ADEA were not received on account of personal injury or sickness. The Court also
held that the claim was not tort-like and that, therefore, the payment did not satisfy the
requirement established by United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992). Schleier, 515 U.S. at
333.
96. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss5/2

18

Hubbard: Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compen
TAXING COMPENSATORY TORT DAMAGES

Rights Act of 1964 97 did not satisfy the requirements for exemption
under section 104. Burke interpreted section 104 to be limited to
compensation for tort or tort-like claims. Based on its review of the
nature of the claim and the limited remedies established by Title V, 98
the Court concluded that the claim was not tort-like and therefore not
included within the scope of section 104.9
It is important to note that O'Gilvie, Schleier, and Burke all focus on
statutory interpretation; the constitutional definition of income is not at
issue."°° As a result of this focus, the Court has not developed a
definition of income in the context of personal injuries. However, when
faced with the issue of whether damages constitute income in other
contexts, the Court has consistently focused on whether the award or
settlement involved a gain. If the damages simply involved a "return of
capital," there was no gain and therefore no income. 1' In contrast,
where the damages involved an accession to capital or a gain in a form
like compensation for lost income or profits, then this accession or gain
constitutes income. °'2

97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1994).
98. Burke, 504 U.S. at 238-39. The Court noted, for example:
Indeed, in contrast to the tort remedies for physical and nonphysical injuries .... "TitleVII does not allow awards for compensatory or punitive damages;
instead, it limits available remedies to backpay, injunctions, and other equitable
relief.
... Nothing in this remedial scheme purports to recompense a Title VII
plaintiff for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury, such
as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential
damages (e.g., a ruined credit rating).
Id.
99. Id. at 241-42.
100. This point is made explicitly in Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328 (Taxpayer "concedes that
his settlement constitutes gross income unless it is expressly excepted.... ."). The same point
was made in Burke. 504 U.S. at 233 ('There is no dispute in this case that the settlement awards
would constitute gross income within the reach.. ." of the statutory definition of income.).
101. See, e.g., supra notes 39-53, 58-62 and accompanying text; infra notes 112-19 and
accompanying text; Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1994)
(damages award for loss of goodwill not income to extent that return of capital involved).
102. See, e.g., supra notes 39-53, 58-62 and accompanying text; infra notes 112-19 and
accompanying text; Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431 (Awards of punitive damages
constitute a gain that is taxable as income because they involve "instances of undeniable
accessions to wealth.. . ."); Raytheon Prod.Corp., 144 F.2d at 113 (damages award for goodwill income to extent that return of capital not involved); cf. United States v. Manufacturers
Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 198 (1960) (receipt of life insurance proceeds income since death of
insured "creates a genuine enlargement of the beneficiaries' rights").
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3. Recent Legislative Limits on the Exclusion
Congress now has explicitly limited the scope of section 104 in two
ways. First, section 104(a)(2) provides that "gross income does not
include.., the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness. ... 103 Second, the section provides: "For purposes of...
[subsection 104(a)(2)], emotional distress shall not be treated as a
physical injury or physical sickness. The preceding sentence shall not
apply to an amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for
medical care... attributable to emotional distress."'"3 4 The Conference
Report indicates that though the exclusion requires physical injury, the
injury does not have to be sustained by the claimant in a suit.
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical
sickness, then all damages (other than punitive damages)
that flow therefrom are treated as payments received on
account of physical injury or physical sickness whether or
not the recipient of the damages is the injured party. For
example, damages (other than punitive damages) received
by an individual on account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the physical injury or physical sickness of such
individual's spouse are excludable from gross income. In
addition, damages (other than punitive damages) received
on account of a claim of wrongful death continue to be
excludable from taxable income as under present law. 5
In contrast, the section 104 exclusion from income is not applicable
if the claim does not have "its origin in a physical injury or physical
sickness.'. 6 "Thus, the exclusion from gross income does not apply
to any damages received.., based on a claim of employment discrimination or injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional
distress."' 7 The Report also indicates that the phrase "physical injury
or physical sickness" does not include the physical manifestations of
emotional distress. Instead, "[i]t is intended that the term emotional

103. 26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(2) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
104. Id. § 104(a).
105. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677,
1793.
106. Id.

107. Id.
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stomach
distress includes symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches,
08
disorders) which may result from such emotional distress."'
It is not clear why Congress decided to limit the exclusion of
compensatory damages for mental distress to situations that have their
"origin in a physical injury or physical sickness." One plausible guess
is that Congress-given the various criticisms of compensating mental
distress voiced by proponents of "tort reform' --was using the tax
code as a tool for tort reform."0 If this tort reform explanation is valid,
such a "back door" approach to reform raises serious questions of policy
concerning not only the failure to articulate this reason publicly but also
the substantive merits of an approach that allows some persons to
exclude both mental distress and lost wages while requiring others to
include awards for mental distress as income."' However, these policy
issues concerning how Congress should exercise its powers are beyond
the scope of this Article. The concern herein is whether Congress has
the power to tax compensatory awards for mental distress as income.
B. Other Injuries-The "In Lieu of What" Test
Because the exclusion from income in section 104 has been limited
to "personal" injuries, the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have
had to determine how to address the taxability of other types of
injuries-for example, injuries to property or to a corporate business
entity."' The approach adopted follows the general scheme for inter-

108. Id.
109. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
110. See J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding PersonalInjury
Awards Under the New Section 104(A)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 184 (1997) ("Mreatment
suggests a fundamental distrust on the part of Congress in the reality of emotional distress.... ."); cf Kahn, supra note 70, at 350 (noting that reasons to tax compensation for
noneconomic losses, like mental distress, are that they are not really compensatory in nature and
that nonphysical losses arouse less compassion).
111. In assessing the merits of the approach of the new version of § 104, it is important
to note that most tort reform proposals criticize the granting of any damages for mental distress
or pain and suffering but only where the claim is based on negligence or strict liability in tort.
See infra note 148 and accompanying text. Few, if any, of the proposals have advocated
eliminating damages for mental distress for intentional torts like assault. Thus, by focusing on
whether physical injury is involved, rather than on the nature of the wrongdoing of the
defendant, § 104 is inconsistent with virtually all tort reform proposals.
112. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 71, at 670-72; Berkowitz & Greenstein, supra note
60; Brooks, supra note 74, at 794-99; Harnett, supra note 71, at 622-24; Yorio, supra note 70,
at 722-33. See generally Robert W. Wood, Tax Aspects of Settlements and Judgments, Tax
Mgmt. (BNA), No. 522, at A-1 to A-41 (May 12, 1997). There are also special statutory
provisions addressing other types of compensation. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 186 (1994) (deduction
for compensatory damages for patent infringement, for breach of contract or fiduciary duty, and
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preting income within the context of the Tax Code. This scheme begins
with the basic premise that Congress intended to use the full measure
of its taxing power and then uses this premise to find legislative intent
to tax any gain or accession to wealth not explicitly excluded by the
Code." 3
Consistent with this approach, an "in lieu of what" test has been
utilized to determine whether taxable gain was involved. 14 Raytheon
Production Corp. v. Commissioner,"5 perhaps the leading case utilizing this approach, notes that in determining whether a compensatory
award to a corporate business entity is taxable, "the question is 'In lieu
of what were the damages awarded?' "116 If the award is in lieu of lost
profits, then it is taxable as income." 7 If the award is in lieu of lost
or damaged capital, then it is necessary to determine whether the award
exceeds the taxpayer's "basis" or investment in the property."' This
process is illustrated in Raytheon by a simple example:
A buys Blackacre for $5,000. It appreciates in value to
$50,000. B tortiously destroys it by fire. A sues and
recovers $50,000 tort damages from B. Although no gain
was derived by A from the suit, his prior gain due to the
appreciation in value of Blackacre is realized when it is
turned into cash by the money damages." 9
11.

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN TORT LAW

A. Basic Framework-Making People Whole Again
Though it is sometimes said that compensation is one goal of tort
law, 2 a compensatory damages award is simply a remedy for a tort.
A tort is not involved unless the defendant's breach of a tort duty has
caused the plaintiff to suffer a legally recognized injury. The liability
rules involved in addressing duty, breach, and causation may be adopted
on the basis of a particular goal or purpose of tort law-for example, to

for antitrust violations).
113. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 112.
115. 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 113.
117. See id.
118. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussion of basis).
119. Id. at 114; see supra note 48 (discussion of realization of gain).
120. See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury,
36 U. FLA. L. REv. 333, 391 (1984).
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deter unreasonable or other wrongful behavior" or to spread certain
types of loss among a large pool of persons so that the victim does not
suffer a lump-sum loss." These liability rules identify who will be
liable for the loss-the plaintiff or the defendant. If, and only if, the
defendant is liable, then damages rules are relevant." Thus, compensation is a remedy that is used as a means of accomplishing goals; it is
not a goal in itself. The distinction between a goal and a means is more
obvious when a different remedy, like injunctive relief for a nuisance,
is involved. In discussing the nature and existence of a nuisance or the
proper role of injunctions as a remedy for nuisance, no one argues that
injunctions are a goal of nuisance law.'24
Since goals and means can be related, there may be a connection
between the nature and amount of damages and the particular goal to be
furthered. For example, if tort law, or an area of tort law, is viewed as
an insurance-type mechanism to spread losses, then one can argue that
compensation should be measured by what a person would want in an
explicit insurance scheme."z Similarly, if deterrence or corrective

121. For a classic analysis of deterrence and tort law, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). For a deterrence-based defense of
compensating for psychic harm, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs
of Accidents: Pain-and-SufferingDamages in Tort Law, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1785 (1995).
122. See CALABRESI, supra note 121, at 39-67. In actual practice, the decision to adopt a
particular liability rule is more often a matter of "balancing" or "weaving" together conflicting
goals to reach a result in a particular context. See id. at 17-33; F. Patrick Hubbard, Efficiency,
Expectation, andJustice:A JurisprudentialAnalysis of the Conceptof UnreasonablyDangerous
Product Defect, 28 S.C. L. REv. 587, 627-30, 634-38 (1977); cf infra notes 172-74 and
accompanying text (discussion of role of weaving conflicting values together in Dworkin's
model of judicial decisionmaking).
123. Similarly, if, and only if, a defendant has committed a wrong, then it can perhaps be
said that providing compensation for that wrong is a goal of tort law. However, this same
statement could be made for contract law. In both tort and contract, providing a remedy for a
breach of a duty is central, but the provision of remedies (without regard to the breach of a duty)
is not a goal.
124. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970); W. PAGE KEETON
Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 640-41 (5th ed. 1984); Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rues, and Inalienability,One View
of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075
OF

(1980).
125. For an argument to this effect concerning mental distress, see Mark Geistfeld, Placing
a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damagesfor
Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 773 (1995). The classic article arguing against
compensation for mental distress in insurance-based schemes is Louis L. Jaffe, Damagesfor
PersonalInjury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1953). For more
general criticisms of awarding damages for mental distress, see infra note 148.
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justice'26 is the goal, then damages, whether compensatory or punitive,12 should be designed to accomplish these goals.
It is interesting to note that the debate about the relationship between
the goals of tort law and the damages recoverable has had virtually no
effect on the measure of compensatory damages in general or of mental
distress in particular. The measure of compensatory damages is the
amount necessary to make the victim whole again-i.e., to place the
victim in the same position he or she would have been in but for the
defendant's tortious conduct." Though this status quo ante measure
is clearly an ideal that can never be realized in practice, it has been the
universal starting place for the determination of compensatory damages
for over a century.' 29
There are many problems with restoring the victim to the status quo
ante. As an initial practical matter, attorneys' fees will reduce recoveries
significantly. Intangible nonpecuniary losses present other, more
conceptual difficulties because there is no objective market value for
these injuries and because an award for pain and suffering or for mental
distress cannot literally restore the status quo. 3" It is important to note
that similar problems with full restoration of the status quo often exist
with tangible, pecuniary losses as well. Even with pecuniary injuries, the
passage of time may make it impossible to restore the victim to status
quo ante in a literal sense. For example, compensation for wages lost
prior to trial cannot literally restore the status quo ante because the
wage earner had to survive without the wages up until the payment of
the compensatory award. Given the uncertainties of tort litigation, it is
not likely that a wage earner could or would borrow the full after-tax
amount of the lost wages pending the outcome of the litigation.

126. For discussions of corrective justice as a goal of tort law, see, e.g.,

ALAN CALNAN,

JUSTICE AND TORT LAW 99-109 (1997); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Jules
L. Coleman, The Practiceof CorrectiveJustice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW

(David G. Owen ed., 1995).
127. Punitive damages are said to be given because of concerns for deterrence and for
corrective or vindicative justice. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1599, 1589,
1601-03 (1996) (concern for punishment, deterrence, and relationship between amount of actual
harm and punitive damages); Gilbert v. Duke Power Co., 179 S.E.2d 720, 723 (S.C. 1971)
("[P]unitive damages are generally regarded not only as punishment for the wrong but also as
vindication of a private right .. ").
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §901 cmt. a (1979); Heidi L. Feldman, Harm
and Money: Against the InsuranceTheory of Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 157780 (1997).
129. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §§ 8.1(1),
8.1(4) (2d ed. 1993); Feldman, supra note 128, at 1577-80.
130. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
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B. Mental Distress
1. Liability Rules Protecting the Right
to Psychic Well-Being-Assault
and Defamation
The liability rules that determine when a plaintiff may recover for
injury to psychic well-being are extremely complex. For example, the
rules concerning negligent infliction of emotional distress are characterized not only by special proof rules but also by a wide variety of limits
on liability.13 1 Where intentional wrongdoing is involved, a plaintiff
cannot usually recover for mental distress unless it accompanies a
physical injury or unless the defendant's conduct is extreme and
outrageous. 13' Despite these limited liability rules for many instances
of mental trauma, there has long been widespread agreement on the
right to recover in some instances. For example, the courts have
imposed liability for mental distress without physical injury for centuries
in assault and defamation cases.
Historically, the uniquely human dimension of psychic security has
been viewed as a basic right, and the law has granted protection for the
fear resulting from intentional acts involving a threat of physical
harm. 33 A long established tenet of criminal law is that actions
"amounting to an attempt or offer to commit personal violence... [are
regarded] as breaches of the peace, because they directly invade that
personal security, which the law guarantees to every citizen."'
The right to personal security, including security from fear and
mental trauma, has also been protected for centuries by the tort action
for assault, which is defined as intentional conduct that puts the victim

131. See F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. Faix, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS
41-44 (2d ed. 1997); KEETON ET AL., supra note 124, § 54.
132. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 131, at 416-24; KEETON ET AL., supra note 124,
§ 12.
133. See infra note 135.
134. State v. Morgan, 24 N.C. (3 Ired.) 134, 136 (1842).
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in reasonable apprehension of a harmful or offensive touching. 35 One
court explained the rationale as follows:
One of the most important objects to be attained by the
enactment of laws and the institutions of civilized society
is, each of us shall feel secure against unlawful assaults.
Without such security society loses most of its value. Peace
and order and domestic happiness, inexpressibly more
precious than mere forms of government, cannot be enjoyed
without the sense of perfect security. We have a right to
live in36 society without being put in fear of personal
harm.
Consistent with the principle that a right implies a remedy, 37 the
victim of an assault is "entitled to recover full compensation, which
includes compensation for her mental suffering, even if there was no
unlawful touching of the body and no physical injury."' 3 Thus, it is
clear that our society has long recognized that the victim of an assault
has a right to recover compensatory damages for the mental trauma
caused by the fright resulting from an assault.
The uniquely human interest in selfhood and psychic well-being has
also been protected for centuries by the right to sue for libel and
slander. 39 Blackstone regarded a person's reputation as one of the
interests encompassed within the natural, absolute right to personal
security."4 "The security of his reputation or good name, from the arts
of detraction and slander, are rights to which every man is entitled, by

135. See, e.g., Smith v. Newsom, 84 Eng. Rep. 722 (1674) (recognizing claim for assault
for "shaking a sword.., on the other side of the street"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 21 (1965); HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 131, at 394-396; KEETON ET AL., supra note 124,
§ 10. Blackstone describes the action for assault as follows:
An assault is an attempt or offer to beat another, without touching him: or as if one
lifts up his cane, or his fist, in a threatening manner at another; or strikes at him,
but misses him; this is an assault, insultus, which Finch describes to be "an
unlawful set upon one's person." This also is an inchoate violence, amounting
considerably higher than bare threats; and therefore, though no actual suffering is
proved, yet the party injured may have redress by action of trespass vi et armis;
wherein he shall recover damages as a compensation for the injury.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120.
136. Beach v. Hancock, 27 N.H. 223, 229 (1853).
137. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 122 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
138. Kline v. Kline, 64 N.E. 9, 10 (Ind. 1902).
139. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 124, at 772-73.
140. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129, * 174.
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reason and natural justice; since without these it is impossible to have
the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right."'' 1 A human
defamation victim suffers not only economic injury but also psychic
harm. "Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by
defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in
the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."' 42 Moreover, these nonphysical harms are sufficiently important
to justify an award of compensatory damages in a negligence-based
defamation action even though such awards may143have some chilling
effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
2. Damages Rules for Compensating
for Mental Distress
The analysis of the nature and measure of compensatory damages for
mental distress must account for four things. First, mental trauma is a
real experience; those who suffer mental distress suffer an actual
loss."* Second, psychological pain is uniquely personal; only the
victim can know how it feels. Others can empathize, but they cannot
literally share, evaluate, or measure the experience. Third, there is no
objective market value for mental trauma. Consequently, determining the
dollar amount of the award requires the subjective conversion of a
nonmarket injury into the market terms of money. Fourth, a money
award to compensate for mental distress cannot literally restore the
victim to status quo ante because money cannot replace, repair, or
eliminate the psychological trauma. It is not possible to go out and buy
a replacement for mental well-being.
In assessing the importance of the last item, it is important to
consider several points concerning the inability of money to correct a
psychological harm. First, the lack of reparation is only partially true.
Money has some restorative effect for victims who suffer from mental
trauma because it can be used to secure psychological counseling 145 or
to provide alternate ways to secure psychic well-being."4 It is also
important to remember that damages for tangible, economic losses can
141. Id. at 134; see hL at 123-26.
142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
143. See id. at 349.
144. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50 ("Actual injury [includes] mental anguish and
suffering.").
145. See Ingber, supra note 83, at 782-83. Expenses for such counseling are excluded from
income under § 104. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
146. See Richard N. Pearson, Liability to Bystandersfor Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Harm-A Comment on the Nature of ArbitraryRules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477, 502 (1982) ('Ten
units of pain is still ten units of pain, but it will be easier to bear in Bermuda.").
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provide only partial restoration where past economic losses are
involved. 47 Finally, it is not clear what the lack of restoration means
in terms of the victim's condition. When one hears of a large award to
compensate a victim who has suffered and will continue to suffer
substantial psychic trauma as a result of an egregious assault, is the
reaction envy ("Wow-what a windfall! I wish I could suffer pain and
get all that money.") or pity ("How sad! That money won't erase the
pain; I'm sure glad that's not me.")? To the extent that pity is common,
it seems clear that the lack of restorative effect does not mean that the
award constitutes a gain to the victim.
Traditionally, the courts have resolved the tension between the reality
of mental distress and the corrective shortcomings and subjectivity of
money damages by relying on the jury to determine an amount
necessary to provide compensation for mental trauma. There has been
academic criticism of awarding any damages'. and there has been
debate about how the jury process should be conducted, for example,
149
questions have been raised concerning such things as evidence,
closing arguments,"s jury charges,' and control of the jury's discretion through the use of award maximums or schedules." However, the
courts consistently have held that, where the appropriate liability rules
have been breached, a psychic injury is compensable and that the
substantive measure of damages is the amount necessary to restore the

147. See supra text following note 130.
148. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 129, at 657-60 (review of criticisms and of "reform"
proposals); Ingber, supra note 83, at 809-10 (arguing against awards for mere negligence but
recognizing role for awards for reckless and intentional misconduct); Jaffe, supra note 125, at
223-25 (arguing against awards in cases where negligence or insurance based schemes are
involved); Clarence Morris, Liabilityfor Painand Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476, 476-82
(1959) (reviewing proposals for eliminating or reducing awards in negligence and strict liability
schemes and arguing for continuing role, particularly for intentional wrongs).
149. Proof of "loss of enjoyment" or "hedonie" damages, particularly through the use of
expert testimony, has been one such issue. See generally Roy F. Gilbert, The Application of
Hedonic Models to Personal Injury Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL ECON. 13 (1994); Reuben E.
Slesinger, The Demise of Hedonic Damages Claims in Tort Litigation, 6 J. LEGAL ECON. 17
(1996).
150. One dispute concerns the use of the so-called per diem argument, which asks the jury
to consider pain in terms of a money price for a unit like a minute, hour, or day and then
multiplies this by the years the pain is to be experienced to get a total dollar figure. The
jurisdictions have split over the propriety of such argument. See James 0. Pearson, Jr.,
Annotation, Per Diem or Similar Mathematical Basis for Fixing Damages for Pain and
Suffering, 3 A.L.R.4th 940 (1981).
151. See generally Geistfield, supra note 125 (summarizing various jurisdictions'
approaches).
152. See, e.g., DOBBS. supra note 129, at 657-58.
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plaintiff to the status quo ante."' Moreover, empirical studies of
verdicts indicate that juries do, in fact, consistently use this measure in
granting awards for psychic injury." Given this consistent adoption
and use of the status quo ante measure, can an award for mental distress
be regarded as income?
The most common argument for treating the award as income relies
upon the concept of "basis," which is the value of a taxpayer's
investment in some property. 55 According to this argument, each
person's basis in psychic well-being is zero for two reasons: (1) people
do not purchase their psychic health; and (2) any expenses for the
maintenance of psychic health are consumption, not investment. Because
of these reasons, any monetary payment for injury to psychic well-being
is a gain over the initial basis of zero.'" Thus, the victim who receives
damages for a psychic injury has received a windfall gain, much like a
person who finds lost property,'" receives a free sample,"' or wins
a lottery.'59 This argument will be addressed below in the discussion
of the constitutionality of taxation of compensatory mental distress
damages as income."
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. ConstitutionalInterpretation
One of the ironies of modem legal scholarship is that theories of
constitutional interpretation are so diverse and complex that they cannot
be fully addressed in an article addressing a specific, concrete constitutional issue."" Nevertheless, despite this diversity, there are several
points on which theorists agree. First, interpretation must somehow

153. See, e.g., id. at 652-60; KEETON ET AL., supra note 124, §§ 10, 12; Feldman, supra

note 128, at 1577-80.
154. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093,

1120-26 (1996).
155. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
157. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, 15.5.2.
158. See id.

159. See 26 U.S.C. § 74(a) (1994); Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1962)
(Cash prize for catching specially tagged fish constitutes income.).
160. See infra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.
161. For a sense of the diversity and complexity of the literature on constitutional
interpretation, see Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, Editor's Foreword, 65

FORDHAM L. Rsv. 1247 (1997). For a useful review and application of theories of constitutional
interpretation interpreting the meaning of "income" in the Sixteenth Amendment in the context
of deciding whether a gift is income, see Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 2-28.
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address the language contained in the Constitution. 62 It is not appropriate to ignore the words in the text or to insert new words. Second,
decisions of the United States Supreme Court have a special, authoritative role. 63 Once again, it is not proper to ignore or invent the content
of these decisions. Third, there is no universally accepted process for
determining the meaning of the constitutional language or of the
authoritative decisions of the United States Supreme Court.'4 However, despite this lack of agreement on the process, there appears to be
some agreement that part of the process is to consider what the authors
of the Constitution might have meant when using particular language. 65 In other words, the intent of the original drafters has some
weight, even if there is disagreement about the content of that intent,
about the methods used to ascertain it, or about the weight it should be
given."
Because these points are nearly universally accepted, this Article has:
quoted and discussed the relevant constitutional provisions; discussed
Supreme Court decisions addressing those provisions; and reviewed the
historical treatment of compensatory damages for mental distress,
particularly in terms of the actions for assault and defamation, to
develop some view as to how these damages might have been viewed
at the time of the adoption of the constitutional provisions. These three
types of materials must be placed within some sort of interpretive
context to determine the constitutionality of taxation of compensatory
damages for mental distress. As indicated above, there is no agreement
on the process or method that should be used to provide this context.
Despite the lack of agreement on process, the consensus on the
authoritative role of constitutional language and of Supreme Court
decisions bars one approach to interpretation. This approach, which
could be termed "constitutional desuetude," adopts the view that certain
parts of the constitution, or certain decisions by the Supreme Court, are
so obviously outmoded, antiquated, and lacking in a meaningful role to
162. See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90, 1195-98
(1987).
163. See Dworkin, supra note 162, at 1254-55; Fallon, Jr., supra note 162, at 1189-90,
1202-04.
164. See LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 1988). See
generally Dworkin, supra note 162; Fallon, Jr., supranote 162, at 1189-92. There is also dispute
over what other factors or sources should be considered. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra; Fallon, Jr.,
supra.
165. See Dworkin, supra note 162, at 1250; Fallon, Jr., supra note 162, at 1195-98.
166. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 359-69 (1986); Dworkin, supra note 162, at
1250; Fallon, Jr., supra note 162, at 1189-90, 1195-98.
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play in modem society that they can be ignored or dismissed with
virtually no discussion. 67 In terms of taxation, this view takes the
position that taxation is so important and complex that the Supreme
Court should simply allow Congress to make policy choices without
interference because, in the modem context, constitutional limits on
Congress's power to tax are so outmoded, arbitrary, and inapplicable
that the proper approach is simply to ignore or reject them. Some
commentators explicitly adopt this view.'68 Others adopt it implicitly
because, for example, they discuss theories of the meaning of income
for taxation purposes as if the language of the Sixteenth Amendment
imposed no limits on the meaning of the term. 69 This approach of
dismissal without discussion would be impermissible under any theory
of interpretation. The proponents of the constitutional desuetude view
must present an interpretive argument indicating why the authoritative
materials are no longer relevant and binding. The authorities cannot be
simply ignored.
One reason for treating the constitutional limits as irrelevant could
be the lack of modem cases holding tax legislation unconstitutional.
However, this lack of cases is more likely the result of congressional
recognition of the constitutional limits 7 ° than the result of an unspo167. See generally Arthur E.Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV,Section 4: A
Study in ConstitutionalDesuetude, 46 M1NN. L. REV. 513 (1962).
168. Though it is not always clear what doctrine or theory is at issue, these commentators
are very clear about their view. See, e.g., JOSEPH T. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS
INcOME 125-26 (1967) (The author refers to the "decrepitude of Eisnerv. Macomber" and argues
that it "should be consigned to the junk yard of judicial history" so that courts will have the
"freedom to interpret Section 61 [of the Code, which defines 'income,'] in a rational manner
unimpaired by inhibitions derived from Pollock and Eisner v. Macomber."); Burke & Friel,
supra note 67, at 21 ("line of authority [excluding nonphysical injuries from income] based on
a discredited theory of gross income"); Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 14, 24 (Based on a
detailed, but debatable, review of cases, author concludes: "Although Macomberhas never been
explicitly overruled, the Court has so narrowed the decision that it retains no force ....
Macomber and its constitutional restraints of realization and ordinary meaning are dead ....
Income's meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the Court .... "); Thuronyi, supra note
83, at 100-01 ("[T]he definition of income... in Eisner v. Macomber has been rejected....
[Under a proper policy approach based on a concern with fairness, is] the concept of income
would be an elastic one, since it could accommodate virtually any congressional definition of
income.... Since income is an arbitrary concept that can be given content only by judgments
about fairness, it is difficult to sustain any other approach as a constitutional matter."); cf.
Christopher S. Jackson, The Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resist Rendering unto CaesarWhatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (1996-1997) (critical review of "constitutional"
bases for resisting income taxation); Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentalityand Irrelevance of
Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009 (1997) (arguing that federalism is rightfully irrelevant
today).
169. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
170. For example, the broad exclusions in § 104 prior to the recent amendments have made
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ken Supreme Court view that constitutional provisions like the Sixteenth
Amendment are so archaic and irrelevant today that it is best not to
mention them, much less apply them."'
This Article addresses this interpretive problem by adopting the
framework for constitutional interpretation adopted by Ronald Dworkin.
Dworkin's framework has two components. The first is a model of the
process of interpretation. The second is a substantive theory of justice
or morality. Dworkin's process component asserts that a judge, after
considering the language of the Constitution and Supreme Court
decisions, must then fit these authoritative materials together in a way
that provides the best "fit" between these materials and a theory of
justice or morality." This process component of Dworkin's interpretive framework is adopted partly because it is familiar"TI and welldeveloped and partly because it is sufficiently general to provide a basis
for both agreement and disagreement. One might agree with Dworkin's
position that a judge must "weave" authorities together with a view of
justice, but disagree as to what that means in terms of a constitutionally
relevant theory of justice or in regard to a specific issue.7
In developing his substantive model of justice, Dworkin consistently
has focused on the nature of human personhood and on the role of rights

it unnecessary to address constitutional issues. See supra notes 87-102 and accompanying text.
171. Cf.United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (first instance since 1930s of holding
that legislation unconstitutionally exceeded power granted by the Commerce Clause).
172. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); DWORKIN, supra note 166, at 355-413; Dworkin, supra note
162; McCaffery, supra note 20, at 87 (Using Dworkin's interpretive model within the context
of the tax code requires that one "always have at least one foot in our actual, contingent,
historically situated community and context, and another foot in political, social, and moral
theory."); cf Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Taxation and Human Capital,13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 189, 194
(1996) (Given changes in society the term "income' in the Sixteenth Amendment must be
interpreted in today's context; "[i]t
would be ludicrous.., to suggest that the definition of
'income' should be limited to the common understanding of the term in 1913."). This creative
process of "weaving" two equal values into a coherent scheme is also a necessary part of
Dworkin's substantive theory of justice, which stresses the need for granting persons equal
concern and respect. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. "Weaving" of conflicting values
or goals is also necessary in the development of liability rules in tort law. See supra note 122.
173. One example of the widespread use of Dworkin's framework is its use for analyzing
the tax code. See McCaffery, supra note 20, at 115-21.
174. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 172, at 3 ('The moral reading [of the Constitution]
is not, in itself, either a liberal or conservative charter or strategy."); F. Patrick Hubbard, Justice,
Creativity,and PopularCulture: The "Jurisprudence"of Mary Chapin Carpenter,27 PAC. L.J.
1139, 1149-50 (1996) (comparison of agreement among diverse theorists, including Dworkin,
as to creative process of combining disparate materials but not on specific content of
combination).
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in defining what it is to be a person." The tort claim for assault is
based on the basic "natural" right to be free from intentional invasions
of the psychic sense of personal security.'76 Because this right is
central to personhood, Dworkin's scheme provides a useful framework
for analyzing the nature of compensation for harm inflicted in violation
of the right. To Dworkin, rights serve as "trumps" that protect individuals from the imposition of majoritarian preferences, including the
preference for "efficiency."'" The constitutional requirement of
apportionment of direct taxes provides such a trump insofar as national
majorities are concerned.' 8 Dworkin stresses that his view of justice
"rests on the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to
equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue of
birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings
with the capacity to make plans and give justice."'79
This focus on equality and on living a life in terms of plans is useful
because it helps structure the analysis of whether compensation for
human psychological suffering constitutes a gain or is, instead, a rough
substitute that places us back where we were before. 80 In particular,
Dworkin's concern for granting each person equal concern and respect
makes it clear that, absent a strong justification, it is arbitrary and
unjustifiable to adopt a definition of income that: (1) treats the
compensation received by an assault victim for loss of mental well-being
as taxable income; and (2) does not treat the enjoyment of mental
security and well-being by those who have not been victimized as
175. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 166; RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION
(1993); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].

176. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
177. See generallyRONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 359-65 (1985); DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 175, at 81-130, 139-49, 184-205.
178. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
179. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 175, at 182. Though the quotation
in the text is from Dworkin's discussion of Rawls' views set forth in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (1971), it is clear that Dworkin shares this view. For example, Dworkin also asserts
the following:
I presume that we all accept the following postulates of political morality.

Government must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human
beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as
human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of
how their lives should be lived. Government must not only treat people with
concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 175, at 272-73.
180. See infra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.
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income. To the extent that there is any difference between the two, the
difference is that the victim appears to be in a worse position. Money
is a limited, and possibly inadequate, substitute for psychic well-being;
compensation is certainly not a gain for the victim. As a result, the
victim's ability to make and implement a life-plan has been substantially
reduced because of the tortious conduct.
Arguably, this conception of justice fits the authorities better than
other conceptions or interpretations of the proper constitutional meaning
of income in the context of taxing mental distress compensation."'
This argument, like any argument based on justice, will be contentious.
However, no other arguments have been developed thus far. In any
event, it is only possible to present one's personal views about
interpretation and hope that shared cultural understandings will provide
the basis for dialogue and perhaps for persuasion. 8
B. Whether the Tax Is an Indirect Excise
Tax on a Transaction
As indicated above in Part I, the initial constitutional issue is whether
the tax on compensatory damages for mental distress is an indirect tax
on income relating to "business, privileges, or employments." '83
Pollock indicates that an indirect tax is involved when Congress taxes
the income from "gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments"' ' because "taxation on business, privileges, or employments
has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such." '85
Thus, it is necessary to consider whether Congress used an excise tax
scheme when it imposed a tax on damages for mental distress.
Excise taxes are indirect taxes' 86 " 'laid upon the manufacture, sale,
or consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to
pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges.' "187 Because of the indirect nature of excise taxes, it is constitutionally
permissible to impose excise taxes on transactions involving property
without apportionment. 88 In contrast, direct taxation, which required
181. See infra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.
182. See Hubbard, supra note 174, at 1142-50.
183. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
184. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 635.
185. Id.; see also id. at 637 (indicating that Congress has the power to impose "excise taxes
on business, privileges, employments, and vocations").
186. Apparently, the only indirect taxes other than excise taxes are duties and imposts. See
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911).
187. Id. at 151 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTrrTIONAL LIMITATIONS 680 (7th ed.
1903)).
188. See supra note 16.
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apportionment in all cases before the Sixteenth Amendment allowed
direct taxation of income, is involved when the tax is imposed on the
ownership of property." 9 Because a tax on a transaction is an excise
tax, there is no direct tax involved where, for example, the federal
government taxes the sale,"9° gift,"' or bequest"9 of property. In
such cases, the taxation is imposed on the transaction, not on the
property. Though it could be argued that the taxation of compensation
for mental distress is an excise type of tax on the privilege of engaging
in the transaction of receiving money as a result of a judgment or
settlement, there are several difficulties with this view of the tax.
First, Congress apparently intends to tax the damages as income. The
taxation provisions are in the Internal Revenue Code, and section 104(a)
addresses inclusions and exclusions in income. Moreover, though the tax
is imposed onthe judgment or settlement amount, the rate of the tax on
a damages award or settlement varies from transaction to transaction
because the rate is determined by the taxpayer's income as a whole.
Indeed, there would be no tax at all if, despite the receipt of the
compensatory award, the taxpayer had no net income for the year. 93
Treating such an income-oriented tax as an excise tax would require a
substantial enlargement of the concept of excise tax beyond its ordinary
usage. Pollock clearly rejected 9such
enlargement beyond the "natural
4
and obvious sense" of the term.

189. See, e.g., United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351 (1988). Addressing the
estate taxation of obligations issued under the Housing Act of 1937, the Court notes:
Well before the Housing Act was passed, an exemption of property from all
taxation had an understood meaning: the property was exempt from direct taxation,
but certain privileges of ownership, such as the right to transfer the property, could
be taxed. Underlying this doctrine is the distinction between an excise tax, which
is levied upon the use or transfer of property even though it might be measured by
the property's value, and a tax levied upon the property itself. The former has

historically been permitted even where the latter has been constitutionally or
statutorily forbidden.
Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
190. See Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 416-17 (1904).
191. See Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929).
192. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41 (1900); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874).
193. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 151-197 (1994) (The Internal Revenue code allows numerous
deductions that reduce taxable income, sometimes to zero.).
194. Pollock 11, 158 U.S. at 619. The Court noted the following:
We know of no reason for holding otherwise than that the words "direct taxes,"
on the one hand, and "duties, imposts and excises," on the other, were used in the
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Second, imposing an excise type of transaction tax on tort awards
would be such a novel concept that it is difficult to characterize and
evaluate such a tax without the benefit of a specific scheme that
explicitly adopts an excise framework. Without such a context, it is
difficult to address a wide range of issues. For example, a broad
approach to transaction taxation could seriously erode cases like Pollock
and Macomber. If payment of money to settle a claim prior to litigation
is a taxable transaction, then the concept of transaction could be used to
tax other returns to capital-for example, repayment of loans. Similarly,
treating the receipt of rental income from property as a transaction
involving the property would be a semantic maneuver that would
circumvent the holding of Pollock that taxation of the income from
property is a direct tax.19 Even if it were proper to treat payments of
compensatory awards as taxable transactions, there would be serious
equal treatment problems with an excise imposed only on awards for
mental distress unaccompanied by a physical injury and imposed at a
rate which varies with the taxpayer's overall income."9
Third, the very nature of the compensatory award indicates that the
tax is, in effect, a direct tax in the ownership of the property interest in
security one owns by virtue of being a person, not a tax on a transaction. Psychic well-being is a uniquely human aspect that is central to
what it means to be a human person." Given this importance, the
right to security from certain types of invasions is regarded as a basic,
natural right. 9 ' Taxing each human for the benefits of possessing and
enjoying emotional well-being would be effectively a poll tax because
it would be laid upon persons without regard to their occupations or
property.' This characterization of the nature of the tax does not
change simply because the tax is only levied on the compensation for
the loss of this human dimension received by those unfortunate enough
to suffer a tortious injury like an assault.
constitution in their natural and obvious sense. Nor, in arriving at what those terms
embrace, do we perceive any ground for enlarging them beyond, or narrowing them
within, their natural and obvious import at the time the constitution was framed and

ratified.
Id.
195. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 10 (Due Process Clause as limit on taxation power).
197. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text; infra notes 203, 217-23 and
accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
199. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281 (1937) (definition of poll tax as tax "laid
upon persons without regard to their occupations or property"); cf. infra note 203 and
accompanying text (nontaxable nature of enjoyment of psychic well-being).
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C. Whether the Tax Is a Tax on Income
Income is defined in terms of gain; if there is no gain to a person,
there is no income."° Thus, the issue of whether compensatory
damages constitute income subject to taxation and the Sixteenth
Amendment depends upon whether the victim who receives compensatory damages for mental distress has received a gain. Given that the
measure of damages is the amount of money necessary to make the
victim whole again,"1 it is hard to see how the victim receives a gain.
Except when applying statutory exceptions like section 104, the
federal courts traditionally have applied an "in lieu of what" test to
determine whether a damages award or settlement involves a gain.'
Under this test, it is necessary to ask whether a compensatory payment
for mental distress is in lieu of something that is otherwise taxable.
Insofar as compensation for mental distress is concerned, the answer to
this question is clear: The damages are not rendered in lieu of something
that is otherwise taxable because the enjoyment of psychic well-being
is not taxable as income."°3 Thus, under the traditional test for gain in
the context of compensation, payments to restore this nontaxable aspect
of being human are not a gain.' 4
The only argument for viewing these compensatory damages as a
gain under this traditional test relies upon the assumption that the
"basis" in psychic well-being is zero. 5 If this assumption is accepted,
then the compensatory award constitutes a gain because any award will
exceed the basis of zero. Thus, a compensatory payment for mental
distress is in lieu of nothing and is, therefore, a windfall gain like a

200. See supra notes 39-62 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 128-30, 153 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
203. It would not be a tax on income because enjoyment of an asset is not, by itself,
income. See, e.g., Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 379 (1934) ("[R]ental
value of the building used by the owner does not constitute income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment."). Moreover, because only humans (as opposed to physical property like
machines and land) enjoy psychic well-being, taxation of all humans for their enjoyment of this
uniquely human aspect would be a capitation tax. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying
text. Though livestock and pets can suffer psychic harm, they also can be bought and sold.
Psychic injury to these animals is not recoverable in tort unless the "productive value" of the
animal is reduced. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 145 (1995). Moreover, because there is a
market in the sale of animals, it is possible to speak in terms of "basis" as the cost of acquiring
and maintaining the animal.

204. See, e.g., United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 311 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The principle at work [in determining taxability as income] is that payment which
compensates for a loss of something which would not itself have been an item of gross income
is not a taxable payment."); Brooks, supra note 74, at 768-73; Yorio, supra note 70, at 713-14.
205. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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prize in a lottery." Does the Sixteenth Amendment prohibit Congress
from adopting the assumption that the basis in psychic health is zero?
It should be noted that the argument that there is no basis in psychic
well-being has been presented in terms of policy analysis. The proponents of the position have not considered whether the argument is
applicable in terms of interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment.' Going
beyond policy and evaluating this argument in terms of the Sixteenth
Amendment requires a more complete consideration of the nature of the
right to psychic well-being and of whether the restoration of this right
by a compensatory payment of money can be regarded as a gain under
the traditional "in lieu of what" test.
The analysis of taxation of any aspect of human enjoyment or
conduct requires a recognition of the fact that humans have overlapping,
dual aspects--economic and personal.2 " In many ways, it makes sense
to speak of humans as a form of "economic property" or "capital." For
example, even though we cannot be bought and sold, we can choose to
sell our labor in market transactions, and some are able to market their
personae even after death.'
However, humans have another,
noneconomic aspect. In contrast to property like machines and factories,
we are not simply economic property that can be viewed solely in terms
of market transactions. Humans also use their talents and economic
property to make and live out their "life plans." ' As a result of this
duality,
[f]or income tax purposes Congress has seen fit to regard
an individual as having two personalities: "one is [as] a
seeker after profit who can deduct the expenses incurred in
that search; the other is [as] a creature satisfying his needs
as a human and those of his family but who cannot deduct
such consumption and related expenditures. 2 .

206. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
208. This duality of human personhood has always presented problems in terms of taxation
analysis. When the Supreme Court was initially trying to identify and define "capitation" and
other "direct taxes," it recognized that taxation of a slave might fall either into the category of
capitation tax or of direct property tax. See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 598
(1880) (noting that 1798 tax act imposed a capitation tax on slaves and that in 1813 slaves were
taxed on the basis of their property value); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 543-44
(1869) (concluding that "Congress, after 1798, regarded slaves, for the purposes of taxation, as
realty").
209. See generally Note, FederalEstate Tax and the Right of Publicity: Taxing Estatesfor
Celebrity Value, 108 HARV. L. REV. 683 (1995).
210. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
211. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44 (1963) (quoting from STANLEY S. SURREY
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Because of this uniquely human duality, a concept like basis, which
functions well with property like trucks or stocks, cannot be simply
transferred with no changes or limits to discussions of injuries to
humans. Basis is generally regarded as purchase price, plus investments
and less depreciation for which a deduction in income has been
allowed.2" Humans do not have a purchase price, and calculations of
the dollar value of human genetic endowments and of the dollar value
of additions to and subtractions from those endowments raise considerable theoretical and practical problems.213 Moreover, as indicated
above, genetic and learned talents and capabilities are used not only for
seeking after profit but also for satisfying needs as a human-i.e., for
living a human life. As a result, "investments" in and "depreciation" of
humans are not treated like investments in property for tax purposes.214
For example, though it might seem that educational expenditures are
investments in human capital, most educational expenditures are not
treated in this manner. Instead, they are viewed as investments in
increased enjoyment of life and are, therefore, not viewed as deductions
or as adding to "basis."2 5 Similarly, it is not clear how to address
living expenses for food, shelter, and health where a taxpayer engages
in the sale of renewable body parts like blood and hair. 6 Educational
expenses and living expenses in relation to the sale of renewable body
parts present difficulties in terms of basis analysis because they involve
the activities of humans both as market oriented "seekers after profit"
and as "creatures satisfying needs as a human."
However, no such difficulties in characterization are involved in
terms of psychic well-being. Emotions only function as a part of an
aspect of our unique "needs as a human" as each of us makes and
implements an individual plan for life. There is no economic dimension.

& WILLIAM C. WARREN, CASES ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 272 (1960)); see BrrrKER &

LOKKEN,
212.
213.
214.

supra note 10, 1 20.1, at 20-39 (discussing the "business-personal borderline").
See supra note 80.
See Stephan, supra note 48, at 1361.
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 262(a) (West Supp. 1997) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided

in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."); Brooks,
supra note 74, at 766-68; Heen, supra note 71, at 555-60; Stephan, supra note 48, at 1358-60.
215. See Griffith, supra note 72, at 1146-47; see generally Clifford Gross, Tax Treatment
of EducationalExpenses: Perspectivesfrom Normative Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 916 (1988);
Heen, supra note 71, at 555-60; Stephan I,supranote 48, at 1407-13.

216. See Lary v. United States, 787 F2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1986) (no basis in blood); United
States v. Garber, 607 F2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979) (issue of whether any profits from sale of unique
blood plasma would constitute income), rehearingen banc rev'g 589 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1979);
Green v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980) (receipts from sale of blood income); Frolik, supra
note 74, at 23-25; Stephan Hm, supra note 48, at 1417-18; Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers
of Bodily Parts,73 COLuM. L. REV. 842 (1973).
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Humans cannot seek after profit by simply buying and selling emotional
states like happiness, sorrow, or fear in market transactions in the way
one can buy and sell one's ability to perform services. Having to work,
rather than to play, may make a person unhappy; but the payment to the
person is for the work, not the unhappiness.217 However, this lack of
economic dimension does not mean that basis is zero. Instead, the lack
of marketability indicates that there is reason to be uncertain concerning
whether this type of human capital can be analyzed in the same way as
economic property. Analysis of basis in terms of dollars spent on
investment is useful when speaking of real or personal property. Such
analysis can also provide assistance in analyzing investment in humans
insofar as humans are acting as market seekers after profit. However, the
literal use of market based concepts of basis is inappropriate in dealing
with an aspect of human personhood like psychic well-being.
Human capital analysis is useful in considering uniquely human
emotional injuries, but only by way of analogy. In particular, the
analogy between economic capital and human capital helps in seeing
that a person receives no gain when receiving "damages that, making up
for a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely,
'return the victim's personal or financial capital.' 218 This analogy
does not require any identification of basis to be applicable. The
traditional torts of assault and defamation protect basic human rights. In
order to protect and implement those rights, victims are entitled to
compensatory damages for the loss suffered. These compensatory
damages "aim to substitute for a victim's physical or personal wellbeing." 219 The measure of these damages is the amount necessary to
restore the victim to status quo ante-no more, no less.' Thus, the
damages are in lieu of psychic well-being and simply restore whatever
basis a person already had in his or her human capital. 1 They are not
a windfall receipt of something for nothing. Nor do they constitute the
217. The amount of the payment for the work may reflect whether the work is psychologically pleasant or unpleasant. However, it is not clear how to treat this point. For example, is the
variation in payment viewed as increased monetary pay for psychic stress and trauma and/or as

"pay" for some jobs in terms of both money and pleasant working conditions? In any event, it
is clear- (1) that employers are not simply purchasing psychic trauma; and (2) employees are not
taxed for any psychic pleasures they derive from their employment.
218. O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 456.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 128-30, 153 and accompanying text.
221. Cf. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 73-74 (1962) (treating, in the context of
statutory construction, wife's basis in marital rights as equal in value to property received in
exchange for such rights); Comment, The Lump Sum DivorceSettlement as a Taxable Exchange,
8 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 593, 600-04 (discussing wife's basis in property received in exchange for

marital rights).
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replacement of human endowment that can be marketed through the sale
of services, a unique persona, or a renewable body part. Indeed, the
taxation of a nonmarketable, uniquely human aspect like emotional wellbeing is, in effect, a capitation or poll tax because it is laid upon
persons without regard to their occupations or property.' Imposing
such a capitation tax only on those who have been compensated for the
loss of this human aspect is both unjustifiably unequal and an unconstitutional, unapportioned capitation tax.
When placed in the context of compensation for the uniquely human
harm of mental distress, the argument that we have a zero basis in
psychic well-being and that therefore compensatory payments for mental
distress are a windfall gain is inapplicable to the constitutional question.
There is no reason or need to identify any specific basis because the
rules for measuring compensation, by their explicit terms, simply return
whatever basis the victim had before the tortious injury. Moreover, the
designation of the basis as zero is not only unnecessary but also a totally
arbitrary refusal to grant any value to rights that cannot be purchased in
a market transaction.' Money is a measure of value, but it is not the
only measure. Instead of following this arbitrary approach to compensation for a loss with no market value, it is better to grant such intangible
and uniquely human losses a "basis" equal to the amount necessary to
restore the status quo ante. This traditional approach was summarized
by Justice Frankfurter as follows:
The principle at work here is that payment which
compensates for a loss of something which would not itself
have been an item of gross income is not a taxable payment. The principle is clearest when applied to compensation for the loss of what is ordinarily thought of as a capital
asset, e.g., insurance on a house which is destroyed.... If
.a capital asset is sold for no more than its basis there is no
taxable gain. The result, then, is the same if it is destroyed
and there is paid in compensation no more than its basis.
There are, to be sure, difficulties, not present where
ordinary assets are involved, in applying this principle to
compensation for the loss of something which has no basis
222. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
223. Cf. Griffith. supra note 72, at 1157-58 (contrasting measurement of taxpayers'
positions by considering utility or by considering only monetary receipts); Hamett, supra note
71, at 627 (Designations of basis in context of intangible injuries "are only statements of the
conclusion [about gain and taxability] and not assistive of reaching it."); William T. Plumb, Jr.,
Income Tax on Gains and Losses in Litigation, 25 CoRNELL L.Q. 221, 234 (1940) ("Mhe
human body and the reputation which are injured are in no true sense capital or property upon
which a value can be placed for the purpose of computing the profit realized....").
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and which is not ordinarily thought of as a capital asset,
such as health or life or affection or reputation.
[P]ayment... as compensation for a loss or injury that
had been suffered ... [is] not taxable either because not
greater in amount than the loss or because the thing lost or
damaged had no ascertainable market value and so it could
not be said that there had been any net profit to the taxpayer through the effectual exchange of the thing lost for the
payment received.225
V. CONCLUSION

Compensation for mental distress is measured by the amount
necessary to restore the victim to the status quo ante. This determination
is made in an adversarial context applying traditional tort rules 'of
liability and damages. The only way to view this compensation as a gain
to the victim is to ignore the reality of the loss suffered by arbitrarily
placing a zero basis on the value of psychic well-being. Such an
arbitrary evaluation ignores the uniquely human quality of mental
distress. Viewing the award as a gain is also contrary to common usage.
People do not think they have experienced a gain when they are simply
returned to status quo ante. The inability of money damages for mental
trauma to restore the status quo in a literal sense does not change this
assessment. Instead, this inability reinforces the conclusion that there is
no gain. We do not ordinarily want to become victims of a vicious
assault even if we believe we will receive monetary compensation for
our fear and continuing psychic trauma. Because there is no gain to the
compensated victim, there is no income under the Sixteenth Amendment. Consequently, because the taxation of compensatory damages for
mental distress is a direct tax and is not apportioned, the tax is
unconstitutional.

224. Kaiser, 363 U.S. at 311 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The opinion also notes that the
taxability of the uniquely human aspects like "health or life or affection or reputation" is not at
issue in the case. Id.
225. Id. at 310.
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